Setting diplomatic traps

ISLAM AND THE WEST

By Daniel Brumberg

On Feb. 15, 1947, the Exodus 1947 set sail for Palestine with some 4,500 Jewish refugees, most of whom were survivors of the Holocaust. The organizers of this fabled expedition fully expected the British to forcefully prevent the passengers from disembarking. As things turned out, they got more than they bargained for: three people died, including a U.S. sailor bludgeoned to death resisting the King's Navy.

Made famous in the Leon Uris bestseller, and even more so, in Hollywood's preposterous rendering of the book, the Exodus 1947's story helped galvanize world public opinion in favor of creating the new Jewish state.

This early example of "soft power" is worth recalling as we ponder the violent end to Israel's boarding of the Gaza bound ship, the Marvi Marmara. The Islamist militants aboard the ship appear to have anticipated a violent confrontation. Indeed, as they prepared to set sail, some declared their readiness for martyrdom.

True to their word (and perhaps even within their rights, if indeed they felt under assault), the militants attacked their Israeli foes as they slid onto the Marmara. It was a David versus Goliath epic on the high seas, complete with militants wielding advanced slingshots and their surprised Israeli adversaries dropping paintball guns in favor of more lethal force.

Why were the Israelis so surprised? Doesn't Mossad watch YouTube? And why didn't Jerusalem fully calculate the damage its raid might do to relations with Turkey, Israel's only regional ally? Having failed to negotiate a solution with Ankara to the Marmara's impending voyage, Israel had a vital geo-strategic interest in avoiding a confrontation that would push Turkey's rulers to more fully embrace Hamas and Iran.

One possible answer is that Jerusalem had already concluded that Turkey is no longer interested in playing the role of regional peacemaker. In a twist of fate that Israel's critics have not anticipated, a truly independent and comprehensive investigation of the Marmara tragedy might very well reveal a troubling troika of indirect links between the flotilla's main Turkish organizer--Isnani Yardim Vakfi-- the militant Islamists who played the role of David, and elements within the ruling AK Party.

While such a finding is in the realm of possibility, we can only hope that Turkey has not fully abandoned its efforts to play a dual role: to be both mediator and Muslim advocate, peacemaker and sympathetic friend of the Palestinian (Islamic) cause. Washington's challenge is to help Ankara revive this tricky balancing act, even as Turkish leaders issue hyperbolic statements that might be designed to sabotage any kind of Israeli-Turkish rapprochement.

The challenges posed by Ankara's multi-faceted foreign policies are not unique to the Turkish case. Indeed, one of the toughest global tasks that the Obama administration faces is how to deal with an expanding club of states that exhibit a similarly Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde-like foreign policy. While many of these states want to sustain cordial relations with the U.S., they also want to reduce or mitigate the global power of the U.S.

At the core of this club are Iran, Venezuela, Russia, and China. Islamist, populist, state-capitalist or socialist, their leaders have a common goal: to push for a multi-polar global system in which the principle of absolute state sovereignty is advanced against any universal notion of human rights or global governance.

In pursuit of this goal, this Autocratic Club of Four has been busy trying to secure friends among a wider, second tier of states. Some, such as Cuba, are happy to oblige, while other second tier states would like to pitch in - but not at the cost of estranging the U.S. or key regional actors. They are thus not "two-faced" in any simple of sense of the word. Instead, countries such as Turkey or Brazil want the world to respect their quest for an international system in which they can exercise real influence.

This balancing act is complicated by the contradictory internal situation facing these states. Presiding over populist coalitions that embrace a multitude of interests, the leaders of Turkey and Brazil have tried to strengthen their rule by echoing the anti-U.S. or anti-Israeli sentiments of some of their followers. But this familiar populist game has alarmed key domestic groups that want good relations with Washington. President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva must avoid antagonizing his pro-export business community or the military establishment. Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan must not only keep an eye on a similar pair of forces: he must also tread carefully lest his party further alienate Turkish secularists.

These tensions present an opening for the U.S., providing that we rely more on our heads than our hearts. I certainly share Tom Friedman's anger at seeing the pictures of Lula and Erdogan embracing Iran's autocratic president. But by itself moral indignation does not make for an effective foreign policy, one that can channel in a positive direction the contradictions, tensions and difficult trade-offs that animate the policies of a Brazil or a Turkey.

Is the administration prepared for this rapidly changing global chess board? The White House's 2010 "Security Strategy" dances around the question. Its familiar, multilateralist vision is preferable to the previous administration's unilateralist ethos. But given the challenges of an increasingly multi-polar world, it offers little in the way of a coherent strategy for encouraging the leaders of strategically important countries such as Turkey or Brazil from pursuing dangerous alliances with autocratic regimes or movements.

Two basic facts should inform Washington's strategy.

First, conditions do matter. Regional powers will continue to stick a finger in Washington's face so long as the U.S. and its friends fail to mitigate the wider conflicts that feed the logic of spoiler diplomacy. Had real progress on the Palestinian-Israeli conflict been made in recent years, I would guess that the vast majority of Turks - including many within the Islamist-oriented AK Party - would today endorse a close Turkish-Israeli relationship.

Second, while they can be a thorn in our side, populists such as Lula or Erdogan do not represent some intrinsic new "evil axis" inexorably following a pre-ordained cultural, religious or ideological script. Political Opportunists rather than True Believers, they will be more likely to support the U.S. and its allies when and if they calculate that the benefits of cooperation exceed the costs.

Absent sustained attention to forging this new strategy, there will be more Marmaras. The most precise laser-guided Bunker Busters, the best-trained Special Forces--none of these things can substitute for a nimble and intelligent diplomacy. Just ask the Israeli Navy commandos who slipped into a snare that was not of their own making.

Daniel Brumberg is Co-Director of Georgetown University's Democracy and Governance Program and a Senior Advisor to the Center for Conflict Analysis and Prevention at the United States Institute of Peace.

By Daniel Brumberg |  June 7, 2010; 2:43 PM ET

 | Category:  Georgetown/On Faith , Islam and the West Save & Share:                 
Previous: National security without religious liberty? | Next: The dignity of pedestrians

Posted by: farnaz_mansouri2 | June 11, 2010 7:41 AM
Report Offensive Comment

Posted by: yasseryousufi | June 10, 2010 2:40 PM
Report Offensive Comment

Posted by: gpcarvalho | June 10, 2010 12:40 PM
Report Offensive Comment

Posted by: farnaz_mansouri2 | June 8, 2010 8:18 PM
Report Offensive Comment

Posted by: whistling | June 8, 2010 7:39 PM
Report Offensive Comment

Posted by: farnaz_mansouri2 | June 8, 2010 6:09 PM
Report Offensive Comment

The comments to this entry are closed.