tag:onfaith.washingtonpost.com,2010:/postglobal/sais/nexteurope//605 2009-08-03T20:53:27Z Movable Type 4.2-en tag:newsweek.washingtonpost.com,2009:/postglobal/sais/nexteurope//605.45847 2009-08-03T20:48:03Z 2009-08-03T20:53:27Z

When the going got rough, the same allies who once cheered Obama's decision turned conspicuously quiet.

Lauren Keane When President Barack Obama pledged to close the Guantanamo Bay detention facility last year, America's European allies cheered. The facility had become a lightning rod for international criticism and a dispiriting symbol of Western hypocrisy on human rights. But with the process of closing the facility now underway, the same allies who once cheered the decision have turned conspicuously quiet. Mark Rhinard is a Senior Research Fellow at the Swedish Institute of International Affairs, Stockholm (mark.rhinard@ui.se). Erik Brattberg is a Research Assistant at the Swedish Institute of International Affairs, Stockholm (erik.brattberg@ui.se). ]]> tag:newsweek.washingtonpost.com,2009:/postglobal/sais/nexteurope//605.45834 2009-07-31T18:17:56Z 2009-08-03T20:45:46Z

Political soul-searching for down-and-out parties in Germany and the U.S.

Lauren Keane It's been a tough four years for Germany's Social Democratic Party (SPD), so much so that comparisons with the U.S. Republican party's woes aren't too far off base. Chancellor Schroeder made an unpopular move to Gazprom just weeks after leaving office; party vice president Kurt Beck stepped down over supporting coalitions with the Left party (Die Linke). Now comes "Limogate": health minister Ulla Schmidt allegedly took her chauffeured limousine on vacation to Spain, where it was stolen. Now the SPD must explain why Schmidt needed the 100,000-Euro vehicle on her vacation, when it should be campaigning for the upcoming September 27th general elections. This won't be easy, since the trip only included two official events: speaking with German retirees and meeting the mayor of the village in which she stayed. Nikolas Foster is a graduate student in Energy and Environmental Policy and International Economics at the Johns Hopkins University Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS) in Washington, DC.]]> tag:newsweek.washingtonpost.com,2009:/postglobal/sais/nexteurope//605.45794 2009-07-27T16:14:59Z 2009-07-28T17:41:42Z

The Afghan war is exposing NATO (which supplies a large majority of the forces) to be the "two-tiered" organization Defense Secretary Gates had warned about,

Lauren Keane Allied efforts in Afghanistan are in danger of failing. Attacks against coalition forces are increasing; the economy remains largely undeveloped, with the dubious exception of poppy production; indigenous Afghan police and military forces still require the strong support of allied forces; and government corruption is rampant. Afghanistan is by nature a difficult country to stabilize, but the reality is that the coalition waging the war is in a fractured state. The effectiveness of coalition troops in Afghanistan, already hindered by a lack of resources, has been undermined by political meddling. For this reason, many coalition partners are punching well below their weight. The meaningful warfighting effort in Afghanistan is being borne by the U.S., along with a small core group of states supplying employable forces - Australia, the UK, Canada, Poland, and the Netherlands - as well as the nascent Afghan security forces. The remaining coalition forces are largely unemployed or unemployable, due to a combination of national caveats (including geographical limitations on where troops can operate), micromanagement by national politicians, and a lack of training and equipment. A highly capable German special operations unit was in Afghanistan for three years and did not complete a single mission; political restrictions prevented its movement into 'hot' areas, rendering it useless. The cohesion of operational forces is further hurt by fundamental strategic differences and an onerous command structure. In other words, the war is exposing NATO (which supplies a large majority of the forces) to be the "two-tiered" organization Defense Secretary Gates had warned about, divided between "some allies willing to fight and die to protect people's security, and others who are not." The U.S., as the de facto coalition manager, has the unenviable task of maximizing the contribution of its allies without alienating them. Now that this war is back on the front-burner, President Obama has tried and failed to convince his European allies to make a more meaningful commitment to the fight during his visit for NATO's 60th Anniversary. In fact, several key allies have recently begun planning or contemplating withdrawal. With the U.S. already stretching the capacity of its armed forces and the President having depleted the much of his soft power arsenal, it is clear that an improved strategy of coalition management is required. In order to encourage deeper engagement by countries where the war in Afghanistan does not resonate to the extent it does in America, it is vital to attain agreement on the desired end state that the war is meant to achieve. Countries that support the war's end, but are hesitant to engage in warfighting, should be persuaded to reconsider. Failing that, those countries under-committing militarily should aid in other ways, such as through monetary, developmental, and diplomatic contributions. But regardless of how countries contribute, allied efforts must be coordinated and applied toward the pursuit of a common strategy, not appealing to the domestic concerns of over 40 nations. The U.S. is limited in its ability to dictate the terms of participation of its allies, but it must be more effective in bringing to light a common strategy and thereby make the best out of an imperfect coalition. tag:newsweek.washingtonpost.com,2009:/postglobal/sais/nexteurope//605.45793 2009-07-27T15:47:13Z 2009-07-27T16:33:39Z

Despite the murder of human rights activist Natalia Estimirova in Chechnya, the subsequent visit of Russian Federation President Dmitry Medvedev to Munich for the annual Petersburg Dialogue meeting between Russia and Germany appears to have gone off swimmingly. Medvedev spoke sharply against the killing and the meeting focused on energy and economic ties, including the purchase of automaker Opel by a consortium including Russia's largest bank....

Lauren Keane the meeting focused on energy and economic ties, including the purchase of automaker Opel by a consortium including Russia's largest bank. ]]> Poles compared the deal to the 1941 Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact between the Nazis and the Soviet Union. The CDU's platform that year accused Schröder of running an "unprincipled" Russia policy. "We want good relations with Russia - but not over the heads of our neighbors...We should also not look away from Russia's problematic domestic developments." The SPD (if not its former leader) may have moved ever so slightly in an Atlanticist direction recently, between the election of Barack Obama and the invasion of Georgia. But the conservatives have surprisingly moved in the other direction. This year's CDU platform claims to want "relations with Russia to be as close as possible." It goes on to say that the "depth and breadth" of relations is dependent on Russia's willingness to fulfill its international obligations at the UN, OSCE and elsewhere, but this is clearly softer rhetoric than four years prior. The evolution of the CDU position on Russia shows that Schröder's closeness to Russia was less of an anomaly and more of signal of a lasting recalibration in German foreign policy. Merkel hardly feels affection for Putin and she has probably done a better job managing the Polish relationship than her predecessor. But Germany was a firm opponent of extending NATO Membership Action Plans to Georgia and Ukraine and its stance against enlargement is unlikely change no matter who is in the chancellor's office and governing coalition. And Merkel underlined her support for the Nord Stream pipeline on Thursday. The United States is looking for, and Germany supports, a "reset" in relations with Russia. Indeed, this is the best option for everyone except hardliners who depend on conflict for their political survival. Unfortunately, Russia has quite a few of those. The American president extended his hand and didn't find a clenched fist in return; Russia is happy to talk, though not to make significant concessions. But the U.S. and its allies must make sure that the Kremlin's other hand isn't up to no good in Russia's "near abroad" in order for détente to progress. There is a very real chance that both Ukraine and Georgia will have new, less anti-Russia governments by this time next year. There are real and practical reasons why citizens in these countries may want this (it is not a comfortable path to be on bad terms with a giant, well-armed neighbor, and an opening has been spotted by politicians who balance east and west, such as Ukrainian Prime Minister Yulia Tymoshenko). There is also likely to be significant manipulation of events in Kyiv and Tbilisi from Moscow. For all of Schröder's closeness with Russia, he asserted the Atlantic alliance's position on new elections in Ukraine in 2004, nudging Putin to allow a re-vote and thus allowing the Orange Revolution to come to fruition. With key elections approaching in Ukraine in January, Ms. Merkel should be expected to stand up to Russian troublemaking even more firmly, especially if she does not have to govern with the SPD in grand coalition after September. The liberal Free Democratic Party, the preferred partner of the CDU, would then take over the foreign policy portfolio. Its leaders have remained steadfast supporters of the transatlantic alliance and critical of Russia's human rights record, although as free-trade liberals they discouraged economic sanctions against Russia in the wake of the war with Georgia. A Black-Gold coalition between the CDU and FDP could conceivably push German foreign policy in a more strongly Atlanticist direction. But don't bet on it - the economic and energy links appear to have tied the chancellor's hands. Theodore Reinert is a M.A. student at Johns Hopkins SAIS and a research assistant at the Center for European Policy Analysis. ]]> tag:newsweek.washingtonpost.com,2009:/postglobal/sais/nexteurope//605.45792 2009-07-27T15:25:00Z 2009-07-27T16:33:03Z

Last Monday, four EU members and Turkey signed an agreement to build the Nabucco pipeline.

Lauren Keane It was a cold winter, especially in several European countries. When Russia stopped pumping natural gas through Ukraine in January because of price disputes, several EU members found that their reliance on Eastern European partners made them surprisingly vulnerable. The lack of natural gas in the middle of the winter summoned the political will to find a solution and reduce the EU's dependence on Russian gas. Mitko Grigorov is a graduate student in European Studies at the Johns Hopkins University Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS) in Washington, DC.]]> tag:newsweek.washingtonpost.com,2009:/postglobal/sais/nexteurope//605.45680 2009-07-10T20:52:43Z 2009-07-27T16:31:57Z

The country elects a former bodyguard with a love of drama and action but little political experience.

Lauren Keane In 2003 California got its Governator. Last weekend, Bulgaria got a hero of its own: Batman was elected the new Prime Minister. The 'Batman' in question is the former bodyguard Boyko Borisov, who for the past few years served as mayor of Bulgaria's capital and who received the nickname for his love of drama and action. He is known to appear promptly at the scene of any significant event, especially if it might be broadcast by any major media outlet. It is not yet clear whether the results of the parliamentary elections, announced late on July 5th, are a cause for celebration or mourning. On the one hand, the Socialist government ruling the country for the past four years was finally sidetracked from the parliamentary landscape. On the other hand, Borisov, who emerged as the new Prime Minister with an uncontested majority, has great public appeal and popularity, but has done little to demonstrate his credentials for political leadership. Maria Stoyadinova is a graduate student in the IR/International Law program at the Johns Hopkins University Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS) in Washington, D.C.]]> tag:newsweek.washingtonpost.com,2009:/postglobal/sais/nexteurope//605.45679 2009-07-10T20:35:37Z 2009-07-27T16:27:04Z

The triumph of Germany's soccer team - made up mostly of immigrants - leaves Germans talking more about who they call their own.

Lauren Keane Nikolas Foster is a graduate student in Energy and Environmental Policy and International Economics at the Johns Hopkins University Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS) in Washington, DC.]]> tag:newsweek.washingtonpost.com,2009:/postglobal/sais/nexteurope//605.45681 2009-07-10T20:02:27Z 2009-07-27T16:35:12Z

Albanian elections promise mixed results.

Lauren Keane Brandon Dorman served as a Peace Corps volunteer in Gramsh, Albania from March 2006 to August 2008 and is currently studying as a masters candidate with Johns Hopkins University's School of Advanced International Studies in Bologna, Italy.]]> tag:newsweek.washingtonpost.com,2009:/postglobal/sais/nexteurope//605.45500 2009-06-22T14:26:19Z 2009-07-27T16:36:18Z

As the United States guts its education system, young Europeans are protesting in the streets for more support for theirs. What gives?

Lauren Keane Nikolas Foster is a graduate student in Energy and Environmental Policy and International Economics at the Johns Hopkins University Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS) in Washington, DC.]]> tag:newsweek.washingtonpost.com,2009:/postglobal/sais/nexteurope//605.45485 2009-06-19T15:54:05Z 2009-07-27T16:28:08Z

Europe votes against its own institutions, even as non-EU countries clamor to become part of them.

Lauren Keane The European Parliament elections turned out to be a democratic disaster. Massive abstention underscored the strong disinterest - if not mistrust - many European citizens have toward the election of their European representatives. This is not good news, now that the European Parliament has begun to wield more authority. In addition, the anti-institutional vote was important. Political parties supporting more European integration actually represent only a small percentage of European citizens. The protest vote is likely to trigger -- or more precisely reopen -- a debate over the legitimacy and popularity of European institutions. Pascal Boniface is the Director of the Institut de Relations Internationales et Stratégiques (IRIS) in Paris. ]]> tag:newsweek.washingtonpost.com,2009:/postglobal/sais/nexteurope//605.45432 2009-06-16T19:21:17Z 2009-06-16T19:40:26Z

Europe is the perfect partner for the U.S.'s new focus on societal security instead of just terrorism.

Lauren Keane The Obama administration's creation of a new Cyber Czar position is the latest indication that a new emphasis on societal security is taking the place of America's old narrow-minded focus on terrorism. The Czar position breaks down the artificial divide between national security and homeland security, effectively invalidating a major anti-terrorism paradigm dominant since 9/11. Combined with a renewed emphasis on dealing with climate threats, the new position indicates a new direction for the U.S. - and not a day too soon. Now it's time to partner with Europe to continue that progress. Arjen Boin is a professor at the Public Administration Institute of Louisiana State University; Bengt Sundelius is a professor at the Swedish National Defence College and Uppsala University. ]]> tag:newsweek.washingtonpost.com,2009:/postglobal/sais/nexteurope//605.45433 2009-06-15T15:32:31Z 2009-06-15T16:27:52Z

As the EU has grown larger, it has also grown more divided than united.

Lauren Keane The question is not whether the EU will again be ready to expand; it is where the EU ought to end. In retrospect, the historic European Union expansion of May 2004 carries more than a hint of irony. The accession of eight former communist nations of Central Europe was in many ways a high point for Europe. The EU monitored these countries' transition towards liberal democracy; it influenced their political culture and guided economic transformation. It wasn't a miracle, as one might mistakenly believe from listening to the European vulgate. But it is safe to say that the EU accompanied a remarkable development. When viewed alongside the quagmire that America was making for itself in Iraq at the time, enlargement became the epitome of Europe's power and of the scale of its ambitions. ]]> non notoriously came down to the "Polish plumber," the imaginary new EU citizen threatening the Gallic labor market with his pipes and screws. In January 2007, then, the EU fulfilled the ill-fated promise of admitting Bulgaria and Romania. In order to assuage their fear of being left behind, Brussels had given the two Balkan countries an entry date, irrespective of their record on domestic reforms. Those judicial and administrative reforms have slowed since the countries' accession, as contract killings and corruption at the highest levels have remained the norm. As for the other Balkans, the troubled nations of the former Yugoslavia, the EU has reiterated ad nauseam its commitment to their "European perspective." But much of the region remains in a political and security limbo, and Brussels has fed into it by trying to adjust its scrupulous criteria and conditions to the precarious situation on the ground. The result is that, with the possible exception of Croatia, it is unclear to the Balkan people if and when they will accede to the Union. The EU has also partly frozen accession talks with Turkey, shortly after it took the momentous step of opening those talks. It did so because of Turkey's reluctance to open its ports to vessels coming from Cyprus. Turkey's size, its large Muslim population, and geographical location are clearly the real reason for Europe's hesitance. Still, the problem is that Ankara has lost its momentum for reform, and Europe has lost its credibility. Each of these instances shows different facets of the European malaise. EU institutions, conceived half a century ago, have adjusted as the Union has taken in more countries, but do require comprehensive reforms in order to function effectively with 30-plus potential members. Pending approval by the Irish, the forthcoming Lisbon treaty will go some way to correcting that, but it can do nothing to rewind the half-decade that Europe has lost. EU expansion was also expected to bring about an ever more diverse Union. Yet, in western Europe, support for further expansion is at an all-time low, even in traditionally pro-enlargement countries such as Britain and Italy. In the wake of the global financial maelstrom earlier this year, politicians from the new member states warned about the descent of a new "iron curtain" in Europe. Economic and social differences have brought out profound divisions, rather than deepening the Union's cherished diversity. Above all, the predicament of these past five years has made it plain that the EU enlargement policy is unsustainable in the long run. Expansion is routinely described as Europe's most successful foreign policy. But taking in country after country hardly qualifies as a foreign policy at all. The question is not whether the EU will again be ready to expand; it is where the EU ought to end. Given the plethora of stakeholders in the European arena, a firm decision on this is not easy to take. But it is the single move likely to shift the focus away from enlargement as an existential question, and back to European integration as the paramount means for fostering prosperity and spreading peace on the Continent. Enlargement has provided a powerful tool to achieve these goals. But it is now sinking the EU because it has become a goal unto itself. Fabrizio Tassinari is a Senior Fellow at the Danish Institute for International Studies and a non-Resident Fellow at Johns Hopkins' SAIS Center for Transatlantic Relations. His book, Why Europe Fears Its Neighbors, will be published in September.]]> tag:newsweek.washingtonpost.com,2009:/postglobal/sais/nexteurope//605.45431 2009-06-12T20:10:03Z 2009-06-12T20:28:27Z

The economic crisis brings Europe a new wave of xenophobia - which is likely to only worsen the recession there.

Lauren Keane rebuked the "negative stereotypes of Islam" and faced the Muslim world with a call for "mutual respect." Yet at the same moment, European sentiment seemed to be moving in the opposite direction. ]]> anti-immigrant and anti-Muslim Freedom Party. Italy has been divided by the immigration debate in the past few weeks, with Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi trying to attract voters by publicly expressing his concerns that the immigrants in Italy make him feel like he is in Africa and not in Europe. Favored candidates in other countries kept up with the xenophobia as well. Amidst protests in the UK, the British National Party (BNP) secured a place in the European Parliament, even though the party does not allow non-white members into its ranks and is famous for its racist platform. Austria's Freedom Party, which is also popular for its fierce opposition to Islam, has gained significant traction. Before the Czech Republic's elections, some candidates compared members of the Roma minority to 'parasites'. And in Bulgaria, nearly 12% of the votes went to the far-right Ataka party, which has become popular for its fascist far-right rhetoric. Ironically, although many analysts believe the economic crisis is fueling this renewed xenophobia, this new wave of anti-immigration sentiment is likely to push the European economies even further into recession. Immigration could provide a much-needed boost to the aging European workforce. It could increase economic productivity and alleviate unemployment pressures that have plagued European economies even prior to the global financial crisis. Concerns that immigrants strain the social security system without benefiting the economy are easy rallying cries, but they are economically unfounded and socially damaging. What is most concerning, however, is that the rise in racist attitudes is likely to aggravate existing problems with protecting the human rights of the EU's immigrants and asylum seekers. In its latest annual report on Europe and Central Asia, Amnesty International noted that discrimination and repression against migrants and people seeking asylum are common across the old continent. Detention of immigrants is widespread; even where it is not, non-citizens face legal discrimination, inadequate health care and exploitation. Authorities in the Netherlands often go as far as incarcerating torture and human trafficking victims. Such abuses are unforgivable in countries that have the economic and legal capacity to provide asylum and help to populations in need, at a time when more and more people across the globe face dire poverty, violence and severe abuse. ]]> tag:newsweek.washingtonpost.com,2009:/postglobal/sais/nexteurope//605.45255 2009-05-27T17:59:39Z 2009-05-27T19:45:05Z

The U.S. is listening to European interests, but not letting them dictate policy.

Lauren Keane President Obama has already graced Europe with his presence more than any other continent - and he'll continue that record with upcoming trips to the D-Day anniversary in Normandy, as well as Buchenwald, Dresden and the G8 meeting in Italy,.He has also addressed issues dear to Europeans' hearts:closing Guantanamo, scheduling the troop withdrawal from Iraq, banning torture. Nevertheless, those expecting a transatlantic love affair will be disappointed. Considering that "Obamania" did not translate into more troops for Afghanistan, a global stimulus spending spree, tougher sanctions against Iran, or even accepting Uighur prisoners, Europe should prepare for a U.S. administration whose policies will be characterized by more pragmatism and less emotion. The lack of emotion is, by itself, not necessarily bad. Few would like to return to the days of divisiveness when "Old Europe" was unwilling to partake in any U.S. "adventures." In the future, where interests coincide, cooperation will flourish. Multilateralism will be one of the pillars of U.S. foreign policy, but it won't be multilateralism for its own sake. Obama is aware of the current limitations to U.S. unilateralism. His administration knows that while the military is engaged in two wars and the country is witnessing a deep recession, it is far more expedient to be pragmatic. His Norwuz holiday message to Iran is a prime example. Europeans should not doubt Obama's willingness to confront Iran if it advances its nuclear agenda. But they should also know that his administration will not go out of its way to harmonize European and American interests. Obama will consider Europe's wishes, but will not shy from confrontation when goals do not overlap. Obama's recent support for Turkey's EU membership annoyed many European governments; it illustrated the new limits of America's sensitivity towards European interests. Along the same lines, Obama continues to press European allies for more military and civilian commitments in Afghanistan. Even the language Obama uses in European diplomacy has changed. The U.S. has dropped the term "war on terror," but continues to remind Europe that Afghanistan is a "joint problem requiring joint solutions." Lastly, Europe and the U.S. have so far shown no signs of cooperating on environmental policies. The administration has not involved any European partners in its planned emissions trading scheme, despite the EU's calls for cooperation. What Obama seems to be developing is a careful balance: America won't act to spite Europe, but it also won't make strategic decisions solely based on Europe's interests. He will listen to Europe's concerns with an attentive ear, but those concerns won't trump American interests. tag:newsweek.washingtonpost.com,2009:/postglobal/sais/nexteurope//605.45216 2009-05-22T16:26:31Z 2009-05-22T16:43:20Z

Obama seems to have given up on missile defense. What will take its place for Central Europe?

Lauren Keane The shift in the Obama administration's policy suggesting a freeze in deployment of the ballistic missile defense system in Poland and the Czech Republic has rekindled the debate in the two Central European countries about their future security relations with the United States. Proponents claim that the suspension of the deployment, together with Obama's attempt to press the "reset button" in U.S.-Russian relations, undermines the security of the region. Opponents suggest that the decision on whether to base elements of a missile defense shield in Central Europe is an internal U.S. matter, and that abandoning the Bush policy could in fact enhance stability in this part of Europe by eliminating a thorny issue in relations with Russia. Moreover, even though the Polish and Czech governments signed on to the plan, neither the Polish nor the Czech parliament has yet to ratify the agreement, and popular opinion is strongly opposed. Michael Wyganowski is the Executive Director of the Center for European Policy Analysis, a Washington based think-tank focused on Central Europe. ]]>